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THE INSURANCE DIRECTOR IN ILLINOIS
FRED W. NETTO
NSURANCE as a business had its rise in Northern
Italy about the year 1300.1 At the beginning, most
insurance transactions were those that are known at
present as Marine Insurance. The earliest legislation in
Italy dealing with this subject was designed to prevent
the granting of insurance on foreign ships. Other legis-
lative enactments prescribed conditions and the form of
the contract. A measure passed in 1401 was enacted in
Genoa for the purpose of taxing persons engaged in
the insurance business and is the earliest known instance
of taxation on Insurance.'
The earliest instance of the creation of a special
administrative agency for the regulation of the insurance
business is found in a Florentine statute of 1523. The
City Magistrate was given the power to appoint Commis-
sioners who had extensive powers to fix a standard form
of policy and the rates to be charged. There were no
provisions requiring insurers to maintain reserve funds.3
In England up to the year of 1870 there were no
restrictions upon the ways and means an insurer should
conduct his business, although the Privy Council in the
sixteenth century had exercised spasmodic control over
the insurance business. In 1574, a certain Richard
Candler was given a monopoly by royal grant of making
and registering insurance policies." Later the Privy
Council abandoned an attempt to fix insurance rates after
the Mayor of London, by means of delaying and evading
the responsibility fixed upon him, had succeeded in with-
I W. R. Vance, "The Early History of Insurance Law," 8 Col. L. Rev. 1
at 6.
2 W. S. Holdsworth, "The Early History of the Contract of Insurance,"
17 Col. L. Rev. 85 at 94.
3 Martin, History of Lloyd's and of Marine Insurance in Great Britain
(1876), p. 28.
4 W. S. Holdsworth, "The Early History of the Contract of Insurance,"
17 Col. L. Rev. 85 at 99.
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holding his co-operation. In 1870 an act 5 was passed
subjecting life insurance companies to a certain measure
of supervision. Each company had to file a sworn state-
ment at certain intervals regarding its financial condition.
Provision was also made for a reserve fund. The Assur-
ance Companies Act of 1909 brought control over fire,
health, and accident insurers. The present regulation of
the insurance business is under the National Insurance
Act. Appointed commissioners administer social insur-
ance. The Industrial Insurance Commissioner controls
private insurance enterprises under the Industrial Asso-
ciation Act of 1923. It is to be noted that the English do
not resort to legislation where other means of social con-
trol are effective.
In the United States the insurer has, from the begin-
ning, been a marked man. The business of insurance
could not flourish while there was no established system
of exchange or currency. At one time usury laws were
applied to insurers.6 Later, the fact that so many cor-
porations were formed created a demand for their gov-
ernmental regulation and supervision. The corporate
form of insurers also made regulation more profitable.
The obtaining of revenue has been a reason for regulating
insurance companies, and some of the earliest regulatory
legislation is found in taxing statutes. Later regulatory
enactments included such subjects as publicity and peri-
odical reports concerning financial status. Still later, we
see the development of independent administrative
agencies for the 'purpose of regulating and supervising
the business of insurance in nearly every state of the
Union and, by 1919, thirty-six states had established
independent departments of insurance within their state
governments.
The earliest legislation dealing with administrative
B 33 & 34 Vict. c. 61, § 3 (1870).
6 W. S. Holdsworth, "The Early History of the Contract of Insurance,"
17 Col. L. Rev. 85 at 86.
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supervision of insurance companies and agents of foreign
insurance companies in Illinois was enacted in 1841,
whereby three Commissioners were appointed to super-
intend subscriptions to the Jo Daviess Marine and Fire
Insurance Company.
7
In the same Act, agents of foreign insurance companies
were required to pay a license fee of two hundred dollars
and to file with the State Treasurer a power of attorney.8
Furthermore, such agents were required to furnish bond
with good and sufficient sureties and were required to file
a statement under oath with the Auditor containing evi-
dence of the company's financial condition as conditions
to the issuing of a certificate to do business.
In 1869, the Auditor of Public Accounts was given cer-
tain administrative powers over the business of insur-
ance. The enactment provided that the Auditor of Public
Accounts should have the power to examine the affairs
and condition of domestic life insurance companies. He
also must have issued a Certificate of Authority to the
company to issue policies before it could be considered to
be lawfully engaged in the business of insurance.
In 1893 the creation of the Insurance Department9 gave
the Insurance Superintendent the powers and duties with
respect to insurance which had previously belonged to the
Auditor of Public Accounts. The same Act also relieved
the Attorney General from any duties heretofore imposed
upon him in relation to certain insurance laws to be
enforced by him. This section referred particularly to
actions to enforce the penalty for discrimination and
injunction proceedings brought in the name of the Attor-
ney General. The same Act gave the Insurance Super-
intendent complete power to exercise control over insur-
ance companies, their officers and agents in this state.
Such control as was exercised by the Insurance Super-
7 Laws 1841, page 150.
8 Laws 1841, page 180.
9 Laws 1893, page 107.
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intendent under the Act of 1893 enabled him merely to
collect taxes, fees, fines, and penalties and to prosecute
in his name violators of the insurance laws. In compar-
ison with the powers that have been given to the Director
under the Code, the Insurance Superintendent had little
discretion and the giving of notice and hearing on con-
troversial questions was totally unknown. The Supreme
Court in 1915 held that this section did not deprive the
Attorney-General of his common-law duties, which were
inherent in his office.' 0
The administration of Insurance was placed under the
Department of Trade and Commerce in 1917.11 The In-
surance Superintendent remained as an officer of, and
responsible to, the Director of Trade and Commerce. But
the Department of Trade and Commerce was abolished
in 1933.12 The office of the Insurance Superintendent was
also abolished, but his powers and duties were transferred
to a newly created Department of Insurance, together
with the powers and duties previously vested in the
Department of Trade and Commerce as the successor of
the Insurance Superintendent, his officers and employees.
Tr LL -- . L & __. . .... ____ ' . .. . . .. ILJ L'L - T11-*_ ^.*_
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insurance laws and the administration thereof were in
archaic condition compared to other states.
The laws on insurance before the time when the Code
was adopted consisted of a mass of inconsistent, ambigu-
ous, and obsolescent statutes which had been enacted from
time to time since 1869. Confusion was caused by the
fact that whenever a new insurance law had been passed
by the Legislature, it failed to repeal other laws incon-
sistent therewith, except by implication. Therefore
efforts were made to pass a uniform set of laws to be
known as the Illinois Insurance Code. The proposed Code
10 Fergus v. Russel, 270 Ill. 304, 110 N. E. 130 (1915).
11 Laws 1917, § 56 (2).
12 Laws 1933, p. 1061, par. 1.
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was not able to pass the Legislature in 1935.13 However,
certain portions thereof dealing with licensing of insur-
ance brokers, solicitors, and company representatives
were passed in 1936. Finally in 1937 the Insurance Code
as amended was passed. This was accomplished after
the Code had been redrafted by the Insurance Committee
of the Illinois State Bar Association and compromises
had been made. A special section repeals all laws incon-
sistent with the provisions of the Code.
In order to examine the scope of administrative control
exercised by the Director and his subordinates, let us
assume that a new insurance company is about to be
organized and incorporated. Depending on the type of
insurance business the new company intends to engage
in, it must comply with the preliminary statutory require-
ments. Then the new company must deliver certain
documents to the Director,14 including duplicate originals
of the articles of incorporation, a copy of its by-laws, a
form of its subscription agreement and certain bonds or
securities. 15 Thereafter the Director must approve or
disapprove the documents and securities furnished.16 He
cannot act arbitrarily because the law provides for notice
on the part of the Director and gives the company a right
to request a hearing should the Director find the docu-
ments and securities to be insufficient. It is further pro-
vided 17 that the Director is to issue a permit to the new
company to solicit subscriptions for two years. This per-
mit may be revoked by the Director after notice and
hearing for certain causes.
The next step is an examination of the company by the
Director after the capital has been fully subscribed and
paid in and a surplus deposited in accordance with the
13 Code passed House by large majority but was defeated in Senate by
four votes because of objections to certain parts of Code on the part of
insurance companies.
14 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 73, § 627.
15 Ibid., § 628.
16 Ibid., § 630.
17 Ibid., § 632.
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statute. If the examination is satisfactory, the Director
will issue a certificate to do business. 18 Prior to the
issuance of the certificate to do business the Director
may approve a written agreement between subscribers
and incorporators surrendering the articles of incorpora-
tion and dissolving the company, provided certain con-
ditions exist or have been complied with. 9 Amendments
to the articles of incorporation must also be approved
by the Director.
20
The Director has broad discretionary powers in the
renewal, revocation, or suspension of licenses and cer-
tificates of authority to do business. 2' However, one
notable feature of the new Code is the fact that it pro-
vides for notice and hearing wherever possible. This was
not true of previous insurance regulation. Apparently,
the necessity of notice and hearing as constitutional safe-
guards against abuse of discretion and power on the part
of administrative officials is now clearly recognized.
The Director also has control over the financial con-
ditions of insurance companies. As previously mentioned
a new company must deposit certain bonds, securities, or
cash to be approved by the Director. This also includes
control over the assets, investments, and financial opera-
tions of insurance companies. The Insurance Code pro-
vides what kind of securities may be acquired as invest-
ments.22 An exception is made where one company merges
18 Ibid., § 636.
19 Ibid., § 637.
20 Ibid., § 642.
21 Insurance Superintendent may refuse or revoke license where expense
of management is not commensurate with income. State ex rel. Woodmen
Acc. Co. v. Conn, 116 Ohio St. 127, 156 N. E. 114 (1927). Insurance Super-
intendent may refuse renewal of license where mutual company failed to make
necessary assessment to pay a judgment. State ex rel. Clinton Mut. Ins. Ass'n
v. Bowen, 132 Ohio St. 583, 9 N. E. (2d) 494 (1937). Refusal of Insurance
Superintendent to renew license held proper where advertisements of com-
panies were misleading, since he, in dealing with foreign insurance companies
and with agents generally, is vested with sound discretion in the exercise
of which he is answerable to no one except for abuse. State ex rel. Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Bowen, 130 Ohio St. 347, 199 N. E. 355 (1936). No case on this
point has as yet been decided in Illinois.
22 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 73, §§ 736, 737.
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with another and the latter company has securities or
assets not approved by law, although considered as legal
investments when they were acquired. The law allows a
certain period of time for the disposition of such assets.
The Director is to grant a hearing on the question of
extending the time for the sale of such assets. 23 There are
also certain restrictions on the acquisition and holding of
real property on the part of insurance companies. 24 The
Director may also find that a company has insufficient
assets or has suffered an impairment of capital, where-
upon he has the power to require a company to make
good such impairment and to discontinue the issuance
of policies. However, he must give them written notice
of those facts. 25 If the order is not complied with during
the time specified in his notice, he may begin injunction
proceedings to restrain the company from doing busi-
ness.
26
Another phase of administrative control over insurance
business is the power to approve or disapprove policy
forms, rates, and premiums 27 as well as the further
control over business-getting methods and expenditure
of funds. The law forbids deceptive statements as to
assets, prescribes contents of advertisements as to finan-
cial condition, and forbids misrepresentation, defamation,
and political contributions.
2
A large part of the Director's administrative powers
in the field of insurance is taken up by inquisitorial and
visitorial powers. There are all sorts of reports and
examinations that may be required from insurance com-
panies or that the companies may be subjected to.' First,
as to reports, there are annual reports or statements to
be filed by every insurance company, whether domestic
23 Ibid., § 738.
24 Ibid., § 740.
25 Ibid., §§ 646, 672, 695.
26 Ibid., §. 801.
27 Ibid., §§ 755, 1036, 1042.
28 Ibid., §§ 759-762.
29 Ibid., §§ 744-748.
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or foreign, doing business in this state. The law pre-
scribes the time of filing and the contents of the statement
to be filed." Printed blanks for that purpose are issued
by the Director's office." The Director also is given a
great deal of discretion in that he may permit the exten-
sion of time for filing the report by any company, for
reasons which he shall deem good and sufficient.
32
The Director is required to cause the annual statements
to be printed in pamphlet form for the information of the
general public, 33 and a penalty is provided for in case a
false or late annual statement is filed.
3 4
Another important function is the examination of com-
panies. It is, of course, impossible that all examinations
can be personally conducted by the Director. It is, there-
fore, provided that examinations may be conducted by
employees of the Insurance Department designated by
the Director. 5 The law says nothing as to when these
examinations shall be conducted, and it is left entirely
within the discretion of the Director when and how often
he may see fit to order an examination of the affairs of
a company. 6 A company need not be given notice as
to a proposed examination. The reason for the absence
of such a provision is obviously because notice and a
hearing might enable a company to cover up any de-
ficiencies in its business affairs. However, after the
examination is made, the examiner is required to make a
complete report, 7 and the Director must grant a hearing
before filing and publishing the report or parts thereof.38
The practice is to send a copy of the Examiner's Report
to the particular insurance company with a form letter
stating that if objections to the report are filed within a
30 Ibid., § 748 (1).
31 Ibid., § 747.
32 Ibid., § 748 (1).
-3 Ibid., § 748 (3).
34 Ibid., § 751.
85 Ibid., § 1014 (1).
36 Ibid., § 744 (1).
37 Ibid., § 744 (3).
38 Ibid., § 744 (4).
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certain period of time, a hearing will be had on a given
day on those matters that have been objected to. The
home department of a state will accept the report of a
foreign Insurance Department on the status of a foreign
company applying for a license to do business. Illinois
has no provision for periodical or routine examinations,
and the Director may order examinations as often as
he deems expedient or as may be necessary and proper.
3 9
The companies must pay the reasonable expenses of
examinations. There is no provision for determining how
expense bills are to be fixed. The chief penalty for
refusal to submit to an examination is the revocation of
the company's license. A penalty for falsification of rec-
,ords is also imposed.4 ° Included in the duty of examining
the affairs of an insurance company is the appraising of
real estate to determine the sufficiency of loans made by
insurance companies. In practice41 the Insurance Depart-
ment probably selects about every fiftieth piece of real
estate for appraisal, because it would be almost impos-
sible to appraise every piece of real estate in which
insurance companies have an investment. Certain restric-
tions apply to insurance companies with respect to ac-
quisition and holding of real property.42 After acquiring
real estate, insurance, companies may hold it for three
years and until the Director thereafter may order a com-
pany to dispose of it. Such order must be based on notice
and hearing and must take into consideration the interest
of the company.
43
Grounds given for making examinations of companies
may be definite or indefinite, or no grounds at all may
be given. Under the law as it stood prior to the adoption
of the Code, the Insurance Department was given dis-
cretion to conduct examinations as often as the Insurance
39 Ibid., § 1013 (c).
40 Ibid., § 746.
41 Patterson, The Insurance Commissioner in the U. S., p. 360.
42 111. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 73, § 740 (1).
43 Ibid., § 740 (2).
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Superintendent deemed expedient or whenever the Super-
intendent deemed it for the best interest of the public
to do so.44 The present Insurance Code sets out fully the
grounds for initiating an examination by the Director
for the purpose of ascertaining assets, conditions, and
affairs of any company.4" An examination may be initi-
ated through a policyholder or others interested in the
affairs of a company. The administrative procedure as
practiced by the Insurance Department is as follows: The
first step is a complaint placed with the Director either
by a policyholder, stockholder, creditor, or another insur-
ance company or corporation relative to a certain subject.
Then follows a notice of the proposed official action to
the party or corporation about which complaint has been
made. Such notice must specify the time, place, and sub-
ject of the inquiry,"0 which may be conducted by the
Director personally or by any one designated by the
Director to conduct such hearing.4
The Director is given the power to subpoena witnesses,
books, papers, and other data relative to the inquiry and
to examine witnesses concerning the subject of the
inquiry." Persons neglecting or refusing to obey a sub-
poena issued by the Director are liable to prosecution and
certain penalties through appropriate court proceedings
which the Director may undertake."9 After the hearing
has been had, the Director should make an order or de-
cision relative to the subject of the inquiry. Such decision
should specify the grounds upon which it has been made.
As the law is well settled that all administrative re-
sources, by way of appeal of the order of an administra-
tive body or official, must be exhausted before the courts
will interfere with such administrative order, a rehearing
44 II. Rev. Stat. 1925, Ch. 73, § 39.
45 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 73, § 744.
46 Ibid., § 1014 (2).
47 Ibid., § 1014 (1).
48 Ibid., § 1015 (1).
49 Ibid., § 1015 (3).
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should be requested by an insurance company that is
dissatisfied with the order or ruling of the Director.
The Code provides for judicial review of orders and
decisions of the Director." The only exception is pro-
vided in the case of an order by the Director to make
good an impairment Of capital or surplus or a deficiency
in the amount of admitted assets. The reason for that
is that the public might be harmed by allowing an insur-
ance company that is suspected of insolvency to continue
in business during the time that judicial proceedings for
review of the order of the Director might require. Upon
a petition for review, the Director within a specified time
must file a transcript of the record of the hearing had
before him.5 1
As to the powers of the Director to make general rules
and regulations with respect to enforcement and execu-
tion of all insurance laws of the state,52 there is no doubt
that the legislature may delegate powers to make reason-
able rules and regulations with respect to a certain sub-
ject to an administrative body or official as long as it
sets a sufficient standard or guide for the administrative
official. The evolution that has occurred in the theory
of the delegation of legislative powers to administrative
bodies is illustrated by two Wisconsin cases, one decided
in 1896'8 and the other in 1928.1 The first case held that
there had been an unconstitutional delegation of legisla-
50 Ibid., § 1019 (1).
51 Ibid., § 1019 (2).
52 Ibid., § 1013.
538 Dowling v. Lancashire Ins. Co., 92 Wis. 63, 65 N. W. 738 (1896), was
a suit upon a Wisconsin standard fire insurance policy, the form of which
had been approved by the Wisconsin Insurance Commissioner. The policy
contained a clause against parol waivers. The contention was that the law
delegating to the Ins. Commissioner the power to prepare, adopt, and approve
a printed form in blank to conform "as near as the same can be made appli-
cable" to the New York standard policy, was an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative power. This contention was upheld.
54 State ex rel. Wisconsin Inspection Bureau v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472,
220 N. W. 929 (1928). This was a proceeding to review and annul an order
of the Insurance Commissioner disapproving certain rules and regulations of
the plaintiff, an insurance rating bureau, created under Wis. Statutes. The
statute gave the Commissioner the power to review any rate to determine
whether the same is unreasonable or discriminating.
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tive power to the Insurance Department in that it had
been given too much discretion to determine the details
of a standard policy form, although the standard form of
New York had been set out as an example by the legis-
lature. The latter case, however, held that certain powers
to prescribe were not an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative powers to the Insurance Department and that
there is a difference between delegation of a power to
prescribe and delegation of the proper administration of
statutes relating to standard provisions in insurance
policies.
The proof that the enforcement of insurance laws can
be best accomplished by the appointment of a single
administrative officer is borne out by the statement of
Professor Patterson that already in 1919 thirty-six states
had a single full-time officer in charge of their insurance
departments. Through the adoption of the Illinois Insur-
ance Code the present Director of Insurance has been
given more powers than any other insurance admin-
istrator has had heretofore. So great are his discretion-
ary powers especially, the Director has been referred to
as a Dictator.
For example, Section 407 of the Code, dealing with
judicial review of orders and rulings of the Director, pro-
vides that any such order or ruling on the part of the
Director is subject to review by the courts of competent
jurisdiction, with the exception of an order by the
Director upon a company to make good an impairment of
capital or surplus or a deficiency in the amount of ad-
mitted assets. This exception to the general rules that
all orders and rulings of the Director are subject to
judicial review places a large amount of discretion into
the hands of the Director and enables him practically
to act as prosecutor, judge, and jury combined. This
combination of legislative, judicial, and executive powers
in the hands of a single administrative officer is deemed
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to be very dangerous by those who contend that the
granting of these combined powers to one individual or
agency of government violates the fundamental principles
of our constitution which is based upon separation of
powers.
We might ask ourselves what is the practical effect of
this exception in Section 407 of the Insurance Code?
An analysis of that exception will demonstrate that
should there be a finding of fact by the Director that any
of the above enumerated conditions exist within a com-
pany, then the Director has the power to order the com-
pany to refrain from doing any business. It is contended
by those who favor this large discretionary grant of
power to the Director that this exception to the general
rule is for the protection of' the public and that to allow
a company, whose financial standing has been found to
be questionable by the Director, to continue in business,
during the time it takes to have a judicial review of this
matter, would cause serious loss and damage to the
public's investment.
It is also contended in favor of such powers by the
Director that such ruling will only be made after due
notice and hearing has been had respecting this issue
and that the company will be given a specified time to
adjust its financial condition and comply with the ruling
of the Director and that if the company should fail to
do so, proceedings for liquidation and rehabilitation will
follow in the natural course of events at which time the
court would have an opportunity to pass upon the ques-
tion whether an impairment of capital or assets actually
exists, thus making the Director's ruling not a final one
on this issue.
On the other hand there is grave doubt whether this
particular exception granting such large discretionary
powers to the Director is constitutionally valid in that
it does not adequately protect the property rights of a
CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW
company and may lead to the taking of property without
due process of law. The power to restrain a company
from doing business, even if only temporarily, may affect
a company's business reputation to such an extent that
it may never recover completely from the effects of such
a ruling on the part of the Director. Another consequence
of such a ruling might be the loss of their investments by
stockholders of a company which is affected by such a
ruling. It is further pointed out that such large dis-
cretionary power not only enables the Director to act
for the benefit of the public, but also might enable him
to discriminate unjustifiably, or to favor special or,
friendly interests. Because of the technical and compli-
cated nature of the business of insurance, the Director
has unusual opportunities to permit or approve to one
company values of assets that are inflated while approv-
ing actual values only to another company. Because the
public has no means of knowing whether the Director has
permitted one company to violate the investment act or
the reserve requirement or has vigorously enforced the
law against another company which may not be on
friendly terms with the Director, it has been suggested
that an advisory council of several members might be
appointed by the Governor. This council would have no
administrative powers but would merely advise with
the Director upon any matter that he might care to sub-
mit to its members for consultation. Another of their
functions would be the making of recommendations and
suggestions to the Director. For that purpose the mem-
bers of the advisory council should be allowed freedom
of access to the Director's office and files. Such a council
exists in the State of New York.
In the opinion of the writer, some solution of the above
problem could be worked out by providing that the
Director commence injunction proceedings in order to
stop a company from doing business, after he had found,
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upon due notice and hearing having been given, that such
company's assets or reserve funds were impaired. At
the hearing upon the petition for an injunction the court
would have ample opportunity to test the correctness of
the Director's ruling upon this issue.
Of course, judicial review is not the only means of con-
trolling the actions of the Insurance Director. First,
there is the very important control that the general public
exercises over the action of the Director by means of
its attitude toward him. The present Director of Insur-
ance has maintained excellent relations with the public.
Private persons have called on and received from the
Director and the Department of Insurance help and
information relative to their claims against companies,
agents, or brokers. Then, too, the Governor, who appoints,
may also recall the Director for cause. The latter pro-
cedure has not been used in Illinois up to the present
time. Control is also possible by legislative action, for
the legislature may prescribe, limit, or add to the powers
of the Director within constitutional limitations. Pro-
fessional control is exercised over the Insurance Director.
His actions can easily be criticized and his mistakes be
pointed out by members of the insurance profession.
Judicial control, of course, is the most important in that
the courts may affirm, set aside, or restrain the order or
decision of the Director.55
There are five types of remedies for specific relief
against the Director by way of mandamus, injunction,
certiorari, prohibition, or statutory appeal or review, and
of these the latter type has been most frequently used in
Illinois. Actions against the Insurance Director or Com-
missioner for damages are very rare because his actions
are those performed as an administrator, and, in issuing
licenses or certificates to do business, he is acting in a
quasi-judicial capacity.5 6
55 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 73, § 1019 (3).
56 Burton v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 229 II. App. 517 (1923), held that the
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Since the Director of Insurance is a public official, the
Department of Insurance is a Department of the State
Government; the books, records and papers of the Depart-
ment, with certain exceptions, are available for public
inspection. 57 The Director, as the head of the Insurance
Department, is required to make an annual report to the
Governor showing the condition of his department and
that of the various companies, 58 as well as including
suggestions and recommendations for the legislature.
The Director works in close co-operation with the
Attorney General. The Director must obtain the opinion
of the Attorney General relative to legal questions and
proceedings. As pointed out previously, an appropria-
tion for legal expenses for the Insurance Superintendent
has been held illegal by the courts on the ground that the
Insurance Superintendent is to call on the Attorney Gen-
eral for legal advice. Under the law as it was in 1917, the
approval of the Attorney General was required before
the Insurance Superintendent was able to issue a certifi-
cate or even before a charter could be granted. 9 The
Attorney General also had the power to wind up non-
I'ateriai assessmenu llfe .... p..-60
The law provides for mergers and consolidation of
insurance companies.0 1 After the necessary requirements
have been complied with, the new company must obtain
a certificate of merger or consolidation and a certificate
of approval from the Director.2 The Director must give
notice stating reasons for his disapproval of a merger or
consolidation to the companies concerned. Upon their
Insurance Superintendent in the exercise of his official powers acts in a
quasi-judicial capacity and equity will not interfere by injunction to control
his action. In State v. Thomas, 88 Tenn. 491, 12 S. W. 1034 (1890), which
was an action on the official bond of the Ins. Commissioner, the court held
that his action in issuing a license was discretionary and therefore judicial.
No liability attached unless action was corrupt.
57 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 73, § 1016.
58 Ibid., § 1018.
59 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1917, Ch. 73, § 178.
60 Ibid., § 247.
(,1 II. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 73, § 768.
62 Ibid., § 774.
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request he must grant them a hearing as to the matter. 3
The Director is also given the right to appear through
the Attorney General in legal proceedings instituted by
dissenting shareholders of a domestic company.64 Dis-
senting policyholders also may file a petition with the
Director for a hearing with reference to the proposed
merger or consolidation. The Director may revoke his
approval of any agreement if any official shall fail to
attend such hearing or produce the required data.66
Reinsurance which is authorized by law67 must be in
the form of agreements approved by the Director. It is
left to the determination of the Director whether the
terms of any such agreement injuriously affect the rights
of policyholders of the companies to the agreement. In
case of his disapproval, the company may request a
hearing.69
The Insurance Code contains a special article on reor-
ganization of foreign companies. 70 With respect to that
subject the Director of Insurance has the power of ap-
proval or disapproval of the proposed plan of reorganiza-
tion.71 The law further provides that after the reorganiza-
tion has been effected, the reorganized company shall be
subject to regulation and control by the insurance
department of this state and other states wherein the
company may be doing business.
72
Due mostly to the effects of the depression is Article
XIII of the Insurance Code dealing with rehabilitation,
liquidation, conservation, and dissolution of insurance
companies. There are numerous grounds for rehabilita-
tion and liquidation as set up by the Insurance Code
3
63 Ibid., § 774 (4).
64 Ibid., § 779.
65 Ibid., § 780 (1).
66 Ibid., § 780 (2).
67 Ibid., § 785.
68 Ibid., § 786.
69 Ibid., § 787.
70 Ibid., §§ 792-798.
71 Ibid., § 795 (2).
72 Ibid., § 798 (b).
73 Ibid., § 800.
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It is provided that if the Director decides that an insur-
ance company should be rehabilitated or liquidated for
any of the reasons enumerated in the Code, he is to report
the same to the Attorney General, whose duty it is then
to file a petition on relation of the Director to have the
company show cause why an order for rehabilitation or
liquidation should not be entered by the court.74 The
court is given complete jurisdiction to enter any order or
enjoin either the company or the Director as the facts
warrant.7 5
Should the court find that cause exists for rehabilita-
tion or liquidation, then the Director is to take possession
of all the assets of the company, but not before the
company is given a full hearing on this point.76 The law
provides that, upon the entry of such an order, the
Director by operation of law is vested with title to all
assets, tangible or intangible, of the company and the
recording of such order is notice to anyone interested.
7 7
The provision that the Director rather than a receiver
shall act as rehabilitator and liquidator constitutes an
important change in the law. This has eliminated the
political aspects of receivership by way of appointment
by the courts. Every one knows how political receivers in
foreclosure cases have been frowned upon by the inter-
ested parties. For that reason it is believed that the
Director, through special deputies, would be able to effect
substantial economy in such cases. Inasmuch as there
are numerous insurance companies which are engaged in
the insurance business in various states, the uniform law
on that subject has been included in the Article on
Rehabilitation and Liquidation.
To facilitate interstate liquidations, the law contem-
74 Ibid., § 800.
75 Ibid., § 801.
76 Ibid., § 802.
77 Ibid., § 803. Purpose of act relating to delinquent insurance companies
is for the benefit and protection of the public against willful default or mis-
conduct by the companies. People ex rel. Palmer v. Acme Plate Glass
Mutual Ins. Co., 292 Ill. App. 275, 10 N. E. (2d) 988 (1937).
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plates that the Director is to conduct the affairs of de-
linquent companies in all reciprocal states. Two grounds,
which had not been previously recognized as grounds for
liquidation, have been inserted. One is the failure of a
company to pay a valid final judgment within thirty days,
the other the refusal of an officer of a company to submit
to examination under oath, after due notice has been
given.
The first duty of the Director as a rehabilitator is to
conduct the business of the company and to attempt to
remove the causes and conditions which led to the institu-
tion of the legal proceedings.7 s The Director is vested
with a wide range of discretion in this regard.
After the Director has taken over control of any such
company, the next step would be some plan for the
mutualization or rehabilitation of its affairs. Notice and
hearing to policyholders, creditors, and other interested
parties of such proposed plan should be given. At such
hearing the supervising court may either approve, dis-
approve or modify such plan for reorganization. 9 It is
apparent, however, that the suggestions by the Director
may have great weight with the court. If the Director
comes to the conclusion that efforts to rehabilitate the
company would be useless, he may petition the court for
an order liquidating the company.80 This section im-
pliedly calls for notice and hearing to interested parties.
If, on the other hand, the Director feels that there is no
further cause for him to continue the company's busi-
ness, he may apply to the court for a discharge of his
responsibility and the return of the management of its
affairs to such company. Here the law provides for a
full hearing.81 In case an order for liquidation is entered
78 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 73, § 804. Court cannot remove liquidating
receiver of insurance company appointed by the Director or control his
action. People ex rel. Palmer v. Niehaus, 356 Ill. 104, 190 N. E. 349 (1934).
79 II1. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 73, § 804 (2).
80 Ibid., § 804 (3).
81 Ibid., § 804 (4).
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the powers of the Director are numerous, also subject to
review by the court. He may dispose of the real and
personal property of the company and sell or compromise
debts or claims owing to the company.12 He may also
enter into a contract of reinsurance on behalf of the
policyholders, subject to approval by the court after a
full hearing.8
The Director may also, during the period of rehabilita-
tion, borrow money and pledge assets of the company on
such terms as may be approved by the court.84 The same
powers as to rehabilitation and liquidation may be used
by the Director against foreign companies for the pur-
pose of preserving local assets for the benefit of local
creditors and policyholders.8 5 The power of the Director
to conduct examinations is not affected by proceedings
for rehabilitation or liquidation,8 6 although such proceed-
ings may be the result of an examination.
The Director as rehabilitator or liquidator has the
same powers to take action to avoid a transfer of assets
or the creation of a lien upon the same as a creditor or
stockholder of the company has when there has been a
fraudulent transaction by the company.
7
Articles XXVI and XXVII of the Code deal with
Motor Vehicle and Fire Insurance Rates. Originally it
had been planned to present these topics as a separate bill
to the legislature due to the controversial nature of the
question. However, when it was apparent that the Code
would be adopted, the Insurance Department requested
82 Ibid., § 805 (2)
83 Ibid., § 805 (4).
84 Ibid., § 807.
85 Ibid., § 809. Superintendent of Insurance as liquidator of insurance
company is vested with all causes of action theretofore vested in the com-
pany, including actions against former directors, but courts may veto his
acts as liquidator. National Bondholders Corporation v. Joyce, 276 N. Y. 92,
11 N. E. (2d) 552 (1937).
86 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 73, § 812.
87 Ibid., § 816 (4). Superintendent of Insurance as rehabilitator of insol-
vent guarantee company may and must disaffirm fraudulent sale of mortgages
to guarantee company, tendering return of such mortgages upon discovery
of fraud. Pink v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 274 N. Y. 167, 8 N. E.
(2d) 321 (1937).
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that the above articles be added to the Code.
By Section 417 of the Code the Director is given no
power to pass upon motor vehicle rates. This section
merely provides that schedules of all rates and charges
shall be filed with the Director. Nowhere under this
article is there any authority on the part of the Director
to give any opinion or grant hearings in rating matters.
But it is apparent that companies and rating bureaus
must take it upon themselves to file rates or schedules
that are not "unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory or
preferential." Otherwise, they are subject to criminal
penalties and their license or the licenses of their agents
and brokers are liable to be revoked or suspended.
Although the standards provided in the statute would be
a sufficient guide to enable the Director to determine the
fairness of these rates or schedules, it is doubtful whether
companies can be constitutionally required to decide at
their own peril whether rates or schedules comply with
standards, which to them are so indefinite. The Illinois
Supreme Court held in Parks v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass
Company88 that "statutes which either forbid or require
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of com-
mon intelligence must necessarily guess at their meaning
and differ as to their application do not constitute due
process of law." Applying this principle to this par-
ticular question at hand it would follow that a higher
degree of certainty should be required before companies
should be subjected to penalties for failing to comply
with standards that may be interpreted with a broad or a
narrow meaning. The powers conferred upon the Director
are not those of direction and initiation pursuant to
general rules by which companies may determine their
rates and schedules, but his powers are merely those of
correction following a violation of the statute.
It has been suggested that this constitutional obstacle
could have been overcome by giving the Director power,
88 360 Il. 130, 195 N. E. 616 (1935).
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after due notice and hearing, to order changes in rates
and schedules that have been filed with him by the com-
panies and forbidding them to issue policies at rates that
are not in accordance with established standards. The
observations made in regard to motor vehicle rates also
hold true with respect to the determination of fire insur-
ance rates. In both of the above mentioned articles there
is a special section as to notice and hearings by the
Director.
Legal opinions are divided as to the desirability of the
expansion of the powers of administrative agencies.
There are those who say that administrative law itself
is foreign to our institutions because its exercise is usu-
ally a combination of executive, legislative, and judicial
functions. And, therefore, they contend that this violates
the doctrine of separation of powers, which is a consti-
tutional principle based on a long historic struggle and
express provisions.89
On the other hand the advocates of more powers to
administrative agencies contend that, due to modern in-
ventions and problems, it is impossible for the three
recognized branches of our government to take care of
all details in connection with the exercise of their par-
ticular functions.90
The controversy evolves mostly around the delegation
of legislative powers to administrative agencies. Over a
hundred years ago the United States Supreme Court, in
1825, held that Congress might, depending on the subject,
delegate legislative powers to others." At that time the
distinction was not well marked between subjects which
must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself and
other subjects in which a general provision may be made,
and power given to those who are to act under such gen-
89 Frankfurter and Davisson, Cases and Other Materials on Adminis-
trative Law (Commerce Clearing House, Chicago, 1932), pp. 637-639.
90 Landis, "Administrative Agencies in Government," Dun's Review
(Nov., 1932), 8.
91 Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 3 at 42, 6 L. Ed. 253 (1825).
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eral provisions to fill in all details. In 1916, Senator Root
before the American Bar Association 92 expressed the
opinion that the doctrine prohibiting the delegation of
legislative powers has virtually retired from the field and
given up the fight against these administrative agencies.
While administrative agencies are under the control of
the legislative and executive branches of government and
are said to have a duty to conform their decisions to the
objectives of the legislature and the executive, neverthe-
less, their decisions or rulings, like those of courts, should
be based on notice and hearing. With respect to the type
of hearing required to be given by administrative agen-
cies, the United States Supreme Court in Morgan v.
United States93 said:
The vast expansion . . . of administrative regulation in re-
sponse to the pressure of social needs is made possible under our
system by adherence to the basic principles that the legislature
shall appropriately determine the standards of administrative
action and that in administrative proceedings of a quasi-judicial
character the liberty and property of the citizen shall be pro-
tected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play. These
demand "a fair and open hearing," -essential alike to the legal
validity of administrative regulation and to the maintenance of
public confidence in the value and soundness of this important
governmental process. Such a hearing has been described as
an "inexorable safeguard" . . . The requirements of fairness
are not exhausted in the taking or consideration of evidence, but
extend to the concluding part of the procedure as well as to the
beginning and intermediate steps.
The maintenance of proper standards on the part of adminis-
trative agencies in the performance of their quasi-judicial func-
tions is of the highest importance and in no way cripples or
embarrasses the exercise of their appropriate authority. On the
contrary, it is in their manifest interest. For . . . if these mul-
tiplying agencies deemed to be necessary in our complex society
are to serve the purposes for which they are created and endowed
with vast powers, they must accredit themselves by acting in
accordance with the cherished judicial tradition embodying the
basic concepts of fair play.
92 51 Am. Bar Ass'n Reps. 355, 368-71 (1926).
93 58 S. Ct. 773, 82 L. Ed. 757 (1938).
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Administrative agencies make rules which have the
force and effect of law and are in form legislative, and
they find facts in proceedings which are fundamentally
judicial in purpose and scope. The judicial power of
review has been the ground upon which the fact-finding
powers of administrative agencies have been sustained
as not constituting a violation of due process or an
invalid delegation of judicial power. The courts will
interfere in all cases involving administrative action
where the constitutional rights of parties are involved,
whether the question raised relates to a rule or to a find-
ing or determination. 4 They will also exercise such pow-
ers of review as are conferred upon them by the act
creating the agency or under general laws.
Legislatures have attempted to preserve the practical
advantages of administrative fact-findings by passing
laws providing that findings of fact, made by these
administrative agencies, shall be conclusive upon the re-
viewing courts. These statutes have made it necessary
for the courts to draw a sharp distinction between find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law. The Insurance Code
ha .. f. uarded the constitutional rights of any 1;;crnt
by providing a trial de novo of any issue before the
reviewing court.
In conclusion it may be said that the 1937 Insurance
Code is a great improvement over insurance legislation
in existence prior to that time. The Code presents a con-
sistent, comprehensive unit eliminating duplications and
obsolete provisions. The Code has not set up a system
of excessive or unreasonable state regulation. The ques-
tion whether the Director has been given too much power
can be answered in the negative, although an advisory
board as set up in the State of New York might be a fur-
ther safeguard against arbitrary or dishonest action on
94 Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287, 40 S. Ct.
527, 64 L. Ed. 908 (1920) ; Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 52 S. Ct. 285,
76 L. Ed. 598 (1932); St. Joseph's Stockyards Co. v. United States, 298
U. S. 38, 56 S. Ct. 720, 80 L. Ed. 1033 (1936).
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the part of the Director. There is no doubt that in the
hands of an honest and capable Director the increase of
powers has made possible the more effective administra-
tion of insurance laws. The only danger lies in the pos-
sibility that in the future an incompetent, politically
minded or corrupt incumbent might use these powers
to carry out unfortunate policies or otherwise injure
the successful administration of insurance laws through
improper practices.
The Code has gone a long way towards assuring the
general public that insurance companies must operate
on a sound financial and actuarial basis. From the stand-
point of safeguarding the solvency of companies and
giving policyholders fair treatment, the Code represents
a distinct advance over prior insurance legislation.
One important feature of the Code is that it requires
the Director to give a hearing in numerous instances
where formerly such a privilege was within his discretion.
The failure to require such hearings has been a major
defect of insurance legislation generally. Although the
Code contains a few undesirable features, it provides on
most points an adequate statutory basis for proper
regulation.
One undesirable feature is that it is not contemplated
that fire and motor vehicle insurance rates should be uni-
form nor that the Director shall fix such rates. The
Director is not given the power to prevent the filing of
rates that, in his opinion, do not meet the standard of the
statute. An objection to the Code made by the companies
is that it allows attorneys' fees in suits against them.
It is contended that a penalty is thus imposed upon them
even when they have a legitimate ground for contesting
a suit. With regard to the merger and rehabilitation
provisions of the Code, it is contended that insurance
regulation is defective when it sanctions a mode of pro-
cedure which "saves from shipwreck the property of the
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canny by means of the jettisons of the unenlightened
and the timid."95
The Code alone will not suffice unless there is an effi-
cient, honest and fearless administration of the law. The
adoption of the Insurance Code has again demonstrated
that the administrative tribunal deserves a place in our
legal system. The Code, for the first time in the history
of Illinois insurance legislation, has placed in the hands
of the Director the necessary means to enable him to
make himself felt as a powerful force in the insurance
business and to accomplish much toward the welfare and
security of the public generally.
95 H. C. Havighurst, "Some Aspects of the Illinois Insurance Code," 32
Ill. L. Rev. 391 at 411.
